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Decision-making involves a complex interplay of emotional responses and reasoning
processes. In this study, we use TMS to explore the neurobiological substrates of moral
decisions in humans. To examining the effects of TMS on the outcome of a moral-decision,
we compare the decision outcome of moral-personal and moral-impersonal dilemmas to
each other and examine the differential effects of applying TMS over the right DLPFC
or right TPJ. In this comparison, we find that the TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC
during the decision process, affects the outcome of the moral-personal judgment, while
TMS-induced disruption of TPJ affects only moral-impersonal conditions. In other words,
we find a double-dissociation between DLPFC and TPJ in the outcome of a moral decision.
Furthermore, we find that TMS-induced disruption of the DLPFC during non-moral,
moral-impersonal, and moral-personal decisions lead to lower ratings of regret about the
decision. Our results are in line with the dual-process theory and suggest a role for both
the emotional response and cognitive reasoning process in moral judgment. Both the
emotional and cognitive processes were shown to be involved in the decision outcome.
Keywords: morality, decision-making, TMS, emotion and reason
INTRODUCTION
In the case of the so-called trolley or switch dilemma (Thomson,
1986), most people find it appropriate to turn a switch, which
changes the direction of a train, to save the lives of five work-
men at the expense of the life of one. By contrast, in the case
of the footbridge dilemma, most people argue that it is inappro-
priate to push a stranger in front of a train, even if it can save
the lives of five. Although the question in both scenarios is sim-
ilar (is it appropriate to save the lives of five at the cost of one
other?), the agents’ responses tend to be different (Greene et al.,
2001). Moral dilemmas occur in situations in which it is unclear
which decisions are right and wrong based on one’s moral val-
ues. Moral dilemmas are categorized as moral-impersonal (e.g.,
trolley or switch dilemma) and moral-personal dilemmas (e.g.,
footbridge dilemma) (Greene et al., 2001). Although the examples
above are exceptional situations; in our social live, at work, or in
other situations we may encounter, we often have to decide how
we will handle a situation in such a way that is morally acceptable.
The current study aims at improving our understanding of how
these moral decisions are made by the human brain.
The dual-process theory tries to explain these differences
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004). According to this theory, moral
decision-making involves an automatic emotional response and a
controlled application of a utilitarian decision-rule. The thought
of being responsible for the death of another person elicits an
aversive emotional response, but in parallel, cognitive reasoning
processes favors the utilitarian option. In moral-personal dilem-
mas, this emotional response is thought to be too strong to be
overruled by the cognitive system. Hence, while one might agree
with the utilitarian standpoint that it is appropriate to save the
lives of five at the cost of one other, being the one that actu-
ally physically takes the other life is too high of a threshold.
In contrast, in moral-impersonal dilemmas, cognitive control
over the lower emotional response leads participants to favor the
utilitarian option (Greene, 2007).
In previous lesion and neuroimaging studies, the dorsolat-
eral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) and temporal-parietal junction
(TPJ), among other areas, were found to be involved in moral
decision-making (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Heekeren et al., 2005;
Mendez et al., 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2007; Koenigs et al., 2007,
2008; Moll and de Oliveira-Souza, 2007; Young and Koenigs,
2007; Kahane and Shackel, 2008; Prehn et al., 2008; Cushman
et al., 2012). Decision making, reward processing, risk taking,
and social cognition are often associated with processes in the
DLPFC (e.g., Yamasaki et al., 2002; Forbes and Grafman, 2010;
Mullette-Gillman et al., 2011; Essex et al., 2012; Hutcherson et al.,
2012; Minati et al., 2012; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2012; Soo Cho
et al., 2012; Steinbeis et al., 2012). Neurons in the prefrontal
cortex were found to be involved in cost-benefit analysis and cat-
egorize stimuli based on the predicted consequences (Hosokawa
et al., 2013). The connectivity between relevant brain areas can
depend upon the specific task (Baumgartner et al., 2012). In
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a study using transcranial alternating current stimulation, Sela
et al. (2012) found that DLPFC activity is important for adaptive
decision-making is a risk-taking situation.
Related to moral decision-making is theory-of-mind (TOM)
and empathy, which are often associated with TPJ functioning
(Saxe, 2006; Young et al., 2010). TOM is a cognitive mecha-
nism which is used when one tries to understand and explain the
knowledge, beliefs, and intention of others (Young et al., 2010;
Korkmaz, 2011). ToM develops at an early age in developing
children and at the age of around 3–4 years, children can use
a ToM in their behavior (Korkmaz, 2011). Moral decision mak-
ing and ToM are closely related to each other, i.e., while making
moral decisions, people will often place themselves in the posi-
tion of the “decision-maker” or the ‘victim’ in the dilemma. ToM
may also lead to a shared emotional response with the described
character in the moral dilemma. TPJ plays an important role in
ToM, empathy, and social cognition (Saxe and Kanwisher, 2003;
Carter et al., 2012; Santiesteban et al., 2012; Van Overwalle and
Vandekerckhove, 2013). Young et al. (2010) have shown that when
the right TPJ is disrupted by magnetic stimulation, the role of
beliefs in moral judgments is reduced.
The emotional and cognitive reasoning processes as identified
in the dual-process theory have been related to activity in the
DLPFC and TPJ (see Greene et al., 2001, 2004 for fMRI results
in which the non-moral, moral impersonal, and moral personal
dilemmas were tested to identify the brain areas in which activ-
ity is related to moral decision-making). Specifically, the activity
in the prefrontal cortex is thought to be important for the cog-
nitive reasoning process, which can counteract the emotional
response. Greene et al. (2001) found that the medial portions
of the medial frontal gyrus, the posterior cingulate gyrus, and
the bilateral angular gyrus showed a higher BOLD response in
the moral-personal condition than the moral-impersonal con-
dition. The right middle frontal gyrus and the bilateral parietal
lobes showed a lower BOLD response in the moral-personal con-
dition than in the moral impersonal and non-moral condition.
These results were very similar to the results presented by Greene
et al. (2004). Furthermore, Greene et al. (2004) show an increased
BOLD response for the bilateral amygdale in personal compared
to the impersonal dilemmas.
Increased activity in DLPFC is thought to be related to
the increased cognitive effort that is put in counteracting the
(non-utilitarian) emotional response (Greene et al., 2004). Given
the role of the prefrontal cortex in moral decision-making, we
hypothesize that when magnetically stimulating this area in our
experiment, we will selectively influence the decision process of
the moral personal dilemmas because the cognitive reasoning
for which the DLPFC is important is disrupted. The other com-
ponent of the dual processing in moral decision-making is the
emotional response. Because the activity in the TPJ is related to
emotional processing and theory of mind (Saxe and Kanwisher,
2003; Young et al., 2010), and because the activity in the parietal
cortex is increased for moral-impersonal dilemmas compared to
moral-personal questions (Greene et al., 2004), we suspected an
important role for this area in moral cognition. More specifically,
considering the data from fMRI experiments in moral cognition,
we hypothesized that when magnetically stimulating this area
during amoral decision, this will selectively influence the decision
process of moral-impersonal dilemmas.
We designed a TMS experiment to examine whether the
DLPFC and TPJ are indeed differentially involved in moral-
judgment. Whereas lesions are often not focal, patients may
develop compensatory strategies, and results across patients are
difficult to compare, our TMS design does not suffer from
these disadvantages. Additionally, whereas neuroimaging corre-
lates activity to behavior, TMS allows us to establish a causal
link between the two. To investigate this role of DLPFC and
TPJ we used chronometric TMS to target the two brain regions
and investigate the role of these areas in moral-judgment. Based
on the literature about the function of the DLPFC and TPJ,
we hypothesized that the DLPFC and TPJ are both involved in
moral decision-making. However, because of their different func-
tions, these two areas are expected to each play their own role in
moral decision-making. If the DLPFC and TPJ are involved in the
moral decision-making process, applying magnetic stimulation
over these areas can influence behavioral measures such as reac-
tion time, decision outcome, and evaluation of the decision. To
examine the roles of DLPFC and TPJ in emotional processing and
cognitive control, we test how they are involved in moral personal
and moral impersonal dilemmas. If the DLPFC and TPJ are dif-
ferentially involved in these two categories of dilemmas, magnetic
stimulation will be able to reveal a double-dissociation between
these two conditions when stimulating the DLPFC or TPJ.
METHODS
The current study is a Talairach-based MRI-neuronavigated,
event-related chronometric TMS study (N = 17) aimed at dis-
rupting the activities in the DLPFC or the TPJ (between-subject
factor) to examine the behavioral relevance of these areas. We
tested the moral-personal, moral-impersonal, and non-moral
dilemmas. For further details on the distinction between moral
conditions, see Greene et al. (2001). In summary, the moral per-
sonal dilemmas are dilemmas in which the described action “(a)
could reasonably be expected to lead to serious bodily harm (b)
to a particular person or a member or members of a particular
group of people (c) where this harm is not the result of deflect-
ing an existing threat onto a different party” (quoted from page
2107 of Greene et al., 2001). Themoral impersonal dilemmas only
meet one or two of these three criteria. Non-moral dilemmas are
related to daily-life situations and do not require moral reasoning
nor are they emotionally salient (in other words, they do not ful-
fill any of the three requirements). The questionnaire is designed
such that participants respond “appropriate” and “inappropriate”
equally often and has been validated in earlier experiments (the
entire questionnaire is available in the supplementary material of
Greene et al., 2001).
PARTICIPANTS
A total of 17 participants (8 males, 9 females; mean age: 23.7
years, range: 18–54 years) were enrolled in this experiment. All
participants were healthy volunteers that met the criteria for par-
ticipating in a TMS experiment. Participants were right-handed,
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and signed informed
consent before the start of the experiment. Participants received
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monetary compensation for participation in the experiment. One
participant was excluded from further analysis because of very
short reaction times, (i.e., most responses were given before TMS
was applied).
CONDITIONS AND STIMULI
Dilemmas were formulated and tested in earlier studies by
Greene et al. (2001). Three moral conditions were used in
the current experiments: non-moral (control condition, 20 tri-
als), moral-impersonal (19 trials), and moral-personal dilemmas
(25 trials), resulting in a total number of 64 trials. Dilemmas
were presented in three screens: the first two screens explain-
ing the context, and the third screen asked the question whether
a given action is appropriate or inappropriate and reminded
the participant which button to press to indicate their answer.
The participants read the dilemma at their own pace and by
pressing a button they continued to the next screen. Both the
response (appropriate or inappropriate) and the reaction times
(RT, measured from the onset of the third screen) were recorded.
After the participant’s response, a fixation cross was presented
for 6 s. This fixation period was followed by four consecutive
evaluation questions, which the participants rated on a scale
from 1 to 6:
• Question 1: How confident are you that you made the right
decision? (With 1, not at all confident to 6, very confident).
• Question 2: Do you feel responsible for the outcome of the
decision? (With 1, no to 6, yes).
• Question 3: Do you feel regret about the decision? (With 1, no
to 6, yes).
• Question 4: Looking back at your decision: would you like to
change your answer? (With 1, no to 6, yes).
Based on the literature the right DLPFC and TPJ were selected
as target regions for the TMS experiment. In each partici-
pant, magnetic stimulation was applied over only one of these
two target sites: right DLPFC or right TPJ. After reading the
dilemma and continuing to the third screen, a train of three
TMS pulses was applied to the target site. The three pulses
were spaced 150ms apart, aiming to disrupt neural activity in
the target site for roughly half a second. In order to find the
crucial time point at which these three areas are involved in
moral judgment, different time points of TMS application were
tested as a within-subject factor. The first pulse was applied
after 1.5, 2, 2.5, or 3 s after onset of the third screen. The
presentation order of the different moral conditions and the
time point of stimulation were both randomized for each par-
ticipant. See Figure 1 for a schematic overview of a single
trial.
PROCEDURE
The participants were instructed that they would be pre-
sented with different (moral) dilemmas and that they had to
judge whether they would find the described action appro-
priate or inappropriate if they were to encounter such a
situation.
Participants underwent a structural MRI for neuronavigation
purposes. Three test pulses were given to the target site for the par-
ticipant to become familiar with the triple-pulse stimulation. The
64 dilemmas were divided over four separate runs so that the par-
ticipant could take a break between runs. The stimuli were pre-
sented and TMS pulses were externally triggered by Presentation
software (Neurobehavioral Systems, San Francisco, CA).
TMS PARAMETERS
TMS was applied using a Magstim Rapid TMS machine and a
figure-of-eight TMS coil. Based on preliminary fMRI results (not
included in this manuscript) we localized the right DLPFC and
right TPJ at the following Talairach coordinates: right DLPFC
x = +39, y = +47, z = +7 (see Figure 1B, left); and right TPJ
x = +60, y = −40, z = +19 (see Figure 1B, right). Although the
TMS target point for the DLPFC is not exactly the same as the
coordinates found for the frontal regions by Greene et al. (2001,
2004), we chose this area because our preliminary fMRI results
showed a difference in BOLD response between the moral per-
sonal and the moral impersonal dilemmas. For each individual
participant, the individual anatomical MRI scan was transformed
to Talairach-space, then the target areas were defined, and finally
the image was transformed back to the native-space of the par-
ticipant to guide the neuronavigated TMS. The figure-of-eight
TMS coil was placed tangential to the scalp and oriented at 90◦
to the individuals central sulcus for the right DLPFC, and at 45◦
to the individuals central sulcus for the right TPJ target site with
the handle always pointing posteriorly. The position of the TMS
coil with respect to the TMS target-areas were monitored online
using Brainsight neuronavigation software (version 2.0, Rogue
Research). The train of three pulses, 150ms apart, was applied
at 70 percent machine output.
DATA ANALYSIS
All the trials in which reaction times were too short (<3.3 s) or
too long (>20 s) were removed from the data. Reaction times
below 3.3 s were considered to be too short because on these trials
the TMS pulses were not applied for the last time condition. To
statistically test the effect of stimulation site (right DLPFC and
right TPJ) and time condition (1.5, 2, 2.5, and 3 s after onset
of the question) on the subjects’ response (appropriate or inap-
propriate), the personal minus impersonal difference score was
calculated for each brain area and each time point. This score
indicates the moral-condition specific change in the dependent
variable for each time point (within subjects) and for each stim-
ulation site (between subjects). We used a t-test for each time
condition to evaluate whether there were any differences between
conditions. Furthermore, the RT and evaluation of the decision
(confidence, responsibility, regret, and whether or not the sub-
ject would like to change his/her answer) were analyzed. Because
there were no time specific effects of TMS on the RT and evalua-
tion of the decision, the data was collapsed over the four different
time conditions for each moral condition, and repeated-measures
ANOVA was used to test the TMS effect that is specific for a brain
area but not time point. When the ANOVA showed a significant
result, a paired samples t-test was used for post-hoc comparisons
between conditions.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of a single trial and stimulation areas.
(A) The first two screens provide the participant with information about the
dilemma, the third screen asks the question to which the participant responds
“appropriate” or “inappropriate.” Reaction time is measured from the onset of
the third screen. The button press to indicate the answer is followed by a
fixation period and four evaluation questions. (B) Stimulation areas. An fMRI
image of the three planes through the Talairach point for the DLPFC on the left,
and the TPJ on the right (BrainTutor software, BrainVoyager QX).
RESULTS
REACTION TIMES
TMS did not exert an effect on reaction time (F = 2.549,
p = n.s.). Figure 2 shows the reaction time for the different
moral conditions for each of the two brain areas (collapsed over
time-points).
RESPONSE
The statistical test of the within-subjects contrast reveals a time-
specific double dissociation between the two stimulation sites
(DLPFC and TPJ) for the moral-personal and moral-impersonal
judgment as shown by a significant difference between the two
stimulation sites when stimulated at 2.5 s (t = 2.779, p < 0.02),
and not for the other three time points (t = −1.056, t = 0.391,
and t = −0.843, with all p-values not significant, for respectively,
1.5, 2, and 3 s). In other words, the number of inappropriate
responses is higher in the moral-personal condition if TMS is
applied after 2.5 s over the DLPFC, whereas, if the TPJ is stim-
ulated 2.5 s after onset of the moral question the number of inap-
propriate responses is higher in the moral-impersonal condition.
Figure 3 shows the proportion of inappropriate responses for the
three moral conditions for, respectively, the DLPFC (Figure 3A)
and TPJ (Figure 3B) stimulation, and the difference between
these two conditions (Figure 3C). As shown in Figure 3A, the
application of TMS on the four different time points over the
DLPFC has no effect on the proportion appropriate and inap-
propriate responses in the moral-impersonal and non-moral
judgment. However, TMS over the DLPFC affects the judgment in
the moral-personal conditions in a time-specific manner. Where
the proportion of inappropriate responses is stable around 60%
at TMS time-points 1.5, 2, and 3 s., the number of inappropriate
responses is higher, around 80 percent, in the condition were the
three TMS pulses were applied 2.5 s after onset of the question
on the screen. Figure 3B shows the effect of magnetic stimula-
tion of the rTPJ on moral decision-making. Stimulation of the
TPJ does not affect the moral-personal and non-moral judg-
ment (horizontal, parallel lines) but the magnetic stimulation
affects the moral-impersonal judgment in a time-specific man-
ner. The proportion of appropriate and inappropriate responses
is changed in late time-points. Figure 3C shows the differential
effect of the magnetic stimulation over the DLPFC vs. TPJ.
After establishing the time-specific double-dissociation in the
first analysis, which shows that TMS over DLPFC specifically
affects the outcome of the moral-personal dilemmas, and TMS
over TPJ specifically affects the outcome of the moral-impersonal
dilemmas, we ran additional post-hoc comparisons to confirm this
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FIGURE 2 | Reaction times in TMS experiment. The three different moral
conditions grouped over the four different time points of TMS application
over the right DLPFC and right TPJ. Error bars indicate one standard error
from the mean on both sides.
result. These post-hoc comparisons aimed at further examining
the effect when the moral dilemmas are compared to the non-
moral control condition. First of all, we used a paired-samples
t-test to compare the moral personal vs. the non-moral condition
at time point 2.5 for the DLPFC. This t-test shows a significant
difference between the moral personal and the non-moral con-
dition (t = −2.890, p = 0.02). Second, we used a paired-samples
t-test to compare the moral impersonal vs. the non-moral con-
dition at time point 2.5 for the TPJ. This t-test shows a trend for
the difference between the moral impersonal and non-moral con-
dition (t = 2.159, p = 0.07). To further examine the specificity
of the effect, we compared the moral personal dilemmas to the
moral impersonal dilemmas at time point 2.5. For the DLPFC this
yielded a significant result (t = 2.355, p = 0.05), for the TPJ, this
result is not significant (t = −1.486, p = n.s.).
Additionally, we have performed further post-hoc comparisons
to examine the specificity of the time-point. We used paired-
samples t-tests to compare the outcome of the decision at trials
in which TMS was applied at 2.5 s to the outcome of the deci-
sion at trials in which TMS was applied at 1.5, 2, and 3 s. For
the DLFPC, this comparison was done for the personal dilem-
mas. The comparison of time point 2.5 against the 1.5 and 3 s
time point is significant (t = −2.890, p = 0.02 for time point
1.5, and t = −2.377, p = 0.05 for time point 3). The difference
between time point 2.5 and 2 is less pronounced (t = −1.810, p =
n.s.). This may be caused by some intersubject variability where
the exact time point may be around the 2.5 s time-point. For the
TPJ data, this comparison was done for the impersonal dilemmas.
FIGURE 3 | Responses in TMS experiment. Proportion inappropriate
responses in the three different moral conditions for the four different time
points of TMS application. Error bars indicate one standard error from the
(Continued)
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FIGURE 3 | Continued
mean on both sides. (A) Right DLPFC—Moral-personal judgment is
significantly modulated by TMS over the right DLPFC if it is applied at 2.5 s
after onset of the moral question. (B) Right TPJ—Moral-impersonal
judgment is significantly modulated by TMS over the right TPJ if it is
applied at 2.5 s after onset of the moral question. (C) Difference between
the effects for the right DLPFC vs. the effects of right TPJ. ∗Indicates a
significant difference between the DLPFC and TPJ, p < 0.05.
The comparison of the 2.5 time point against the 2 and 3 s time
point is significant (t = −2.982, p = 0.02) and close to signifi-
cant (t = −2.283, p = 0.06), respectively. The comparison of the
2.5 and 1.5 is not significant (t = −1.488, p = n.s.) and the effect
in the TPJ data is therefore less clear. The time-point comparison
shows a clearer result for the DLPFC than it does for the TPJ.
Given these post-hoc tests, the effect in the first analysis is
driven by both the effect of TMS on the DLPFC as well as the
TMS on the TPJ and supports the conclusion for before men-
tioned double dissociation. However, the results for the DLPFC
seem to be statistically more reliable than the results for the TPJ.
EVALUATION
In order to test for a change in the evaluation of the decision
outcome, repeated measures ANOVAs were performed for the
ratings on the four evaluation questions. Overall, the partici-
pants were very confident about their decisions and they rated
their level of confidence on average between four and six for all
three moral conditions and two stimulation sites. However, there
was a main effect of moral condition (Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rected, F = 41.793, p < 0.01). The post-hoc paired samples t-test
showed that all three conditions differed significantly from each
other (impersonal vs. personal: t = 3.185, p < 0.01; impersonal
vs. non-moral: t = −6.439, p < 0.01; personal vs. non-moral:
t = −8.317, p < 0.01). Participants showed the highest confi-
dence levels for non-moral decisions (average rating of 5.65),
followed by their confidence in the moral-impersonal condition
(average rating of 5.10), finally participants showed the lowest
confidence levels in the moral-personal condition (average rat-
ing of 4.78). There was no effect of TMS on the confidence rating
(F = 3.406, p = n.s.).
In all moral conditions, participants felt very responsible for
the decision that they made with ratings that were on average
5.30. There were no differences between conditions: no effect
of TMS (F = 0.053, p = n.s.) and no effect of moral condition
(F = 0.754, p = n.s.).
The regret ratings were influenced by magnetic stimulation.
Figure 4 shows the regret ratings for the three moral condi-
tions and the two different stimulation sites. The main effect
of moral condition was significant (Greenhouse-Geisser cor-
rected, F = 39.960, p < 0.01) and post-hoc paired samples t-test
comparisons show that all three moral conditions differ signifi-
cantly from each other (impersonal vs. personal: t = −3.832, p <
0.01; impersonal vs. non-moral: t = 6.278, p < 0.01; personal
vs. non-moral: t = 7.001, p < 0.01). The highest regret rating
was observed in the moral-personal dilemmas, lower ratings were
observed in themoral-impersonal dilemmas, and very low ratings
were observed in the non-moral control questions. The main
FIGURE 4 | Regret levels in TMS experiment. The three different moral
conditions are grouped over the four different time points of TMS
application over the right DLPFC and right TPJ. Error bars indicate one
standard error from the mean on both sides. ∗Indicates a significant
difference between the DLPFC and TPJ, p < 0.05.
effect of stimulation site was significant (F = 7.390, p < 0.02)
and the pairwise comparisons between the two brain sites showed
that the regret ratings after TMS over the right DLPFC are lower
from the regret ratings aftermagnetic stimulation of the right TPJ.
For the last question, participants indicate that they do not
wish to change their judgment. There is no effect of TMS (F =
4.062, p = n.s.) but the main effect of moral condition is sig-
nificant (Greenhouse-Geisser corrected, F = 17.970, p < 0.01).
The paired samples t-test was used for post-hoc comparisons to
show that this effect is caused by higher ratings in the moral-
personal (average rating of 1.50) andmoral-impersonal dilemmas
(average rating of 1.40) compared to the non-moral dilemmas
(average rating of 1.17) (impersonal vs. personal: t = −1.747,
p = n.s.; impersonal vs. non-moral: t = 3.927, p < 0.01; personal
vs. non-moral: t = 5.221, p < 0.01).
DISCUSSION
Previous research has shown that the DLPFC plays a role in rea-
soning and decision-making (Baraclough et al., 2004; Ernst and
Paulus, 2005; Van’t Wout et al., 2005; Fleck et al., 2006). Our
results confirm this role of DLPFC in moral decision-making.
(Greene et al., 2001, 2004) show a stronger activity in the frontal
cortex for the moral-personal condition than in the non-moral
and moral-impersonal condition. They hypothesize that this is
because the high-conflict moral-personal dilemmas require more
cognitive control over the initial emotional response. In moral-
personal dilemmas, the emotional response generally favors
the non-utilitarian option. The cognitive reasoning process can
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overrule the initial emotional response and thereby favor the util-
itarian option. In other words, if the emotional response does not
reach a certain “threshold,” the cognitive reasoning can overcome
the initial emotional response. This threshold determines whether
or not one would sacrifice one thing in order to achieve a pre-
set goal. For example, in the footbridge and trolley dilemmas, the
participant has to decide whether or not it is appropriate to sacri-
fice one life in order to save five. The dual-process theory (Greene
et al., 2001, 2004) predicts that the emotional response in the
trolley dilemma is lower than in the footbridge dilemma and cog-
nitive control generally overrules the non-utilitarian emotional
response. In contrast, the emotional response in the footbridge
dilemma is much higher (reaches threshold) and the cognitive
control does not overrule this response.
The situations described inmoral-personal dilemmas aremore
emotionally salient than dilemmas in the non-moral and moral-
impersonal dilemmas. The participant’s decision might lead to
serious bodily harm in another person, which will lead to feel-
ings of empathy. Participants may also reason about the dilemma
from the viewpoint of another person described in the dilemma,
i.e., they use a TOM. Both feelings of empathy and TOM are
related to activity in TPJ (Saxe, 2006; Young et al., 2010). Our
results show an important role of the TPJ in moral judgment
and are therefore in line with earlier findings. Experiments using
fMRI (Greene et al., 2004), have found the cingulate cortex to be
involved in moral judgment. In earlier studies, the cingulate cor-
tex was found to be involved in the emotional response (Greene
et al., 2001; Moll et al., 2005). Since the moral-personal dilem-
mas are more emotionally salient, the higher activity observed in
themoral-personal condition is consistent with this. Another area
that is conjectured to be associated with the emotional response
is the temporal cortex (Heekeren et al., 2005; Moll et al., 2005).
In the chronometric TMS experiment we aimed to reveal the
brain regions that are involved for distinct aspects of the moral
decision-making process. Stimulation of the right DLPFC and
right TPJ does not influence the reaction time or response in the
control task (non-moral judgment) in a time-specific or time-
unspecific manner. Therefore, any effect observed in the two
experimental TMS sites (right DLPFC and right TPJ) can reason-
ably be assumed to be caused by the magnetic neural stimulation,
and not by any general or time-specific effect of things such as dis-
comfort, the clicking noise of the TMS coil, or startling effect of
the TMS pulses itself. The statistical analysis of the responses after
magnetic stimulation of the right DLPFC and right TPJ shows
two interesting effects: (1) A time-specific double-dissociation of
DLPFC and TPJ when looking at the difference between moral
personal and moral impersonal dilemmas; and (2) a lower feeling
of regret after the decision when TMS was applied over DLPFC
when compared to application over TPJ.
First, there is a time-specific effect of TMS of the right DLPFC
and right TPJ on moral decision-making. TMS over the right
DLPFC and the right TPJ in moral judgment leads to a time-
specific double dissociation in the roles of these brain areas.When
stimulating the right DLPFC 2.5 s after onset of the question,
the decision outcome in the moral-personal judgment condi-
tion becomes less utilitarian (see Figure 3A). The non-utilitarian
decisions are associated with the decisions based on the initial
emotional response. According to the dual-process theory, the
DLPFC is involved in cognitive control over the initial emotional
response. After TMS over the right DLPFC, behavior changes in
such a way that is consistent with less cognitive control over the
emotional response. If we consider the footbridge dilemma, the
participant makes an emotional decision and is less likely to push
a person off a bridge to save the lives of five others after TMS over
the right DLPFC. When stimulating the right TPJ 2.5 s after onset
of the question, the decision outcome in the moral-impersonal
condition becomes less utilitarian (see Figure 3B). Although the
moral-impersonal dilemmas do in itself elicit a weaker emotional
response when compared to moral-personal dilemmas (Greene
et al., 2001, 2004), the decision outcome of the moral-impersonal
dilemmas changes in such a way that TMS seems to “boost” the
emotional response in these dilemmas. If we consider the trolley
dilemma, TMS of the right TPJ makes the participant less likely to
turn the switch and change the path of the train to save the lives
of five others at the expense of one.
Our main statistical analysis showed a double dissociation
between the results of the DLPFC and TPJ. However, although
this double dissociation seems to be driven by the results obtained
in both the DLPFC as well as in the TPJ condition, we would like
to point out that the post-hoc statistical analysis also shows that
the results for the DLPFC are statistically more reliable than those
for the TPJ.
Second, after making their non-moral, moral-impersonal, and
moral-personal decision, participants were asked to evaluate the
decision. Effects of TMS on the evaluation questions can be
caused by either a direct TMS effect on the evaluation, or, more
likely, an indirect effect on the evaluation that is caused by chang-
ing the decision process with TMS.We observed that, although we
change the participants’ moral judgment in a time-specific way,
in hindsight, they do not change their response, they feel con-
fident about their judgment, and they take full responsibility for
their actions. The feelings of regret are influenced by the magnetic
stimulation of the DLPFC. After right DLPFC stimulation, partic-
ipants show less feelings of regret than after magnetic stimulation
of the right TPJ. This last finding indicates that the right DLPFC
is involved in evaluating the outcome of the decision process.
This experiment adds to the evidence of a critical role of right
DLPFC and right TPJ in moral decision-making. Further exper-
iments are needed to further enhance our understanding of how
moral decision-making is accomplished in the human brain, and
what specific aspects and cognitive processes are contributed to
by the right DLPFC and right TPJ. Beyond such considerations,
the current study is somewhat limited in statistical power because
of the chronometric study design that includes many levels of
the tested variables. Furthermore, the number of study partici-
pants is relatively small and in any case, it would be interesting
to examine a larger subject pool to increase the generalizability
of our findings. Such future studies should consider the effects
of diverse cultural and ethnic backgrounds, as well as age, gen-
der, education level, etc. Follow-up studies of our results are thus
important to offer a replication and allow for further rigorous sta-
tistical testing of our findings, strengthen our conclusions, and
allow examination of various individual factors and inter-subject
variability. Furthermore, given that our frontal TMS target area
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does not exactly overlap with the coordinates of the frontal areas
reported by Greene et al. (see for example Greene et al., 2001,
2004), it could be the case that there are several sub regions within
the frontal cortex which are involved in moral decision making.
Future research could aim to find out how these parts of the
frontal cortex are involved in moral decision making and what
their specific roles are in various moral cognition tasks.
In conclusion, there is a double dissociation between the
DLPFC and TPJ in moral decision-making. Our results are in
accordance with the dual-process theory, which distinguishes
an initial emotional response and a more elaborative cognitive
reasoning that can both influence the decision outcome. By influ-
encing either the emotional response or the reasoning process
in an online event-related TMS paradigm, we showed that the
outcome of the moral decision could be influenced. Whereas dis-
ruption of the DLPFC during the decision makes the outcome
of moral-personal judgment becomes less affirmative, disruption
of TPJ affects moral-impersonal conditions. Disrupting activity
in the DLPFC lead to lower feelings of regret after the decision,
indicating that the DLPFC is involved in the evaluation of the
decision.
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